Digging deep in the bowels of baseball-reference one will find very interesting data on a wide variety of subjects. Here's the chart, with explanations to follow:
SH | GIDP | PrdOut | BaseRunners | Advances | ||||||||||||||
---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
Tm | Att | Suc | % | Opp | DP | % | Opp | Suc | % | BR | BRS | BRS% | <2,3B | Scr | % | 0,2B | Adv | % |
ARI | 11 | 8 | 73% | 114 | 9 | 8% | 59 | 29 | 49% | 384 | 55 | 14% | 43 | 24 | 56% | 33 | 23 | 70% |
ATL | 8 | 5 | 63% | 84 | 9 | 11% | 46 | 14 | 30% | 313 | 45 | 14% | 19 | 11 | 58% | 14 | 7 | 50% |
BAL | 5 | 4 | 80% | 108 | 13 | 12% | 52 | 12 | 23% | 340 | 52 | 15% | 29 | 13 | 45% | 29 | 16 | 55% |
BOS | 2 | 1 | 50% | 111 | 9 | 8% | 52 | 18 | 35% | 377 | 61 | 16% | 46 | 24 | 52% | 27 | 16 | 59% |
CHC | 3 | 3 | 100% | 71 | 8 | 11% | 45 | 14 | 31% | 277 | 33 | 12% | 27 | 8 | 30% | 23 | 10 | 43% |
CHW | 3 | 1 | 33% | 89 | 10 | 11% | 45 | 16 | 36% | 285 | 36 | 13% | 21 | 13 | 62% | 16 | 6 | 38% |
CIN | 10 | 7 | 70% | 132 | 10 | 8% | 57 | 18 | 32% | 446 | 68 | 15% | 47 | 25 | 53% | 30 | 17 | 57% |
CLE | 2 | 1 | 50% | 94 | 8 | 9% | 51 | 14 | 27% | 295 | 35 | 12% | 21 | 8 | 38% | 20 | 10 | 50% |
COL | 12 | 8 | 67% | 118 | 12 | 10% | 55 | 18 | 33% | 385 | 68 | 18% | 27 | 20 | 74% | 17 | 10 | 59% |
DET | 5 | 3 | 60% | 138 | 11 | 8% | 66 | 23 | 35% | 451 | 64 | 14% | 46 | 21 | 46% | 27 | 14 | 52% |
HOU | 2 | 1 | 50% | 92 | 5 | 5% | 43 | 9 | 21% | 325 | 46 | 14% | 38 | 17 | 45% | 24 | 12 | 50% |
KCR | 5 | 3 | 60% | 98 | 15 | 15% | 55 | 14 | 25% | 317 | 51 | 16% | 35 | 18 | 51% | 19 | 12 | 63% |
LAA | 7 | 5 | 71% | 113 | 15 | 13% | 61 | 22 | 36% | 346 | 39 | 11% | 31 | 15 | 48% | 16 | 10 | 63% |
LAD | 9 | 7 | 78% | 122 | 12 | 10% | 62 | 20 | 32% | 395 | 31 | 8% | 25 | 12 | 48% | 27 | 15 | 56% |
MIA | 10 | 8 | 80% | 111 | 16 | 14% | 59 | 15 | 25% | 312 | 29 | 9% | 22 | 9 | 41% | 22 | 11 | 50% |
MIL | 4 | 2 | 50% | 103 | 13 | 13% | 43 | 9 | 21% | 316 | 43 | 14% | 30 | 14 | 47% | 19 | 7 | 37% |
MIN | 2 | 2 | 100% | 99 | 5 | 5% | 46 | 13 | 28% | 336 | 46 | 14% | 24 | 11 | 46% | 15 | 3 | 20% |
NYM | 1 | 1 | 100% | 106 | 7 | 7% | 39 | 8 | 21% | 345 | 65 | 19% | 34 | 22 | 65% | 19 | 8 | 42% |
NYY | 2 | 2 | 100% | 107 | 11 | 10% | 46 | 10 | 22% | 328 | 46 | 14% | 18 | 7 | 39% | 13 | 5 | 38% |
OAK | 1 | 1 | 100% | 132 | 14 | 11% | 58 | 15 | 26% | 440 | 73 | 17% | 46 | 22 | 48% | 25 | 13 | 52% |
PHI | 4 | 4 | 100% | 95 | 13 | 14% | 39 | 17 | 44% | 306 | 42 | 14% | 28 | 15 | 54% | 13 | 9 | 69% |
PIT | 8 | 7 | 88% | 87 | 11 | 13% | 45 | 15 | 33% | 296 | 46 | 16% | 22 | 12 | 55% | 23 | 9 | 39% |
SDP | 11 | 11 | 100% | 103 | 10 | 10% | 52 | 24 | 46% | 356 | 49 | 14% | 27 | 17 | 63% | 25 | 15 | 60% |
SEA | 6 | 5 | 83% | 108 | 16 | 15% | 37 | 16 | 43% | 334 | 42 | 13% | 19 | 11 | 58% | 20 | 14 | 70% |
SFG | 14 | 12 | 86% | 128 | 16 | 13% | 65 | 21 | 32% | 407 | 63 | 15% | 44 | 24 | 55% | 25 | 15 | 60% |
STL | 11 | 10 | 91% | 90 | 11 | 12% | 55 | 18 | 33% | 324 | 70 | 22% | 35 | 18 | 51% | 21 | 16 | 76% |
TBR | 3 | 3 | 100% | 89 | 11 | 12% | 57 | 21 | 37% | 298 | 36 | 12% | 25 | 11 | 44% | 20 | 13 | 65% |
TEX | 8 | 6 | 75% | 92 | 14 | 15% | 51 | 19 | 37% | 299 | 38 | 13% | 26 | 13 | 50% | 15 | 11 | 73% |
TOR | 0 | 0 | 87 | 12 | 14% | 45 | 19 | 42% | 285 | 38 | 13% | 22 | 14 | 64% | 18 | 10 | 56% | |
WSN | 8 | 8 | 100% | 78 | 12 | 15% | 44 | 18 | 41% | 277 | 44 | 16% | 26 | 16 | 62% | 17 | 9 | 53% |
LgAvg | 6 | 5 | 79% | 103 | 11 | 11% | 51 | 17 | 33% | 340 | 48 | 14% | 30 | 16 | 52% | 21 | 12 | 55% |
177 | 139 | 79% | 3099 | 338 | 11% | 1530 | 499 | 33% | 10195 | 1454 | 14% | 903 | 465 | 52% | 632 | 346 | 55% | |
SH | GIDP | PrdOut | BaseRunners | Advances | ||||||||||||||
Tm | Att | Suc | % | Opp | DP | % | Opp | Suc | % | BR | BRS | BRS% | <2,3B | Scr | % | 0,2B | Adv | % |
Provided by Baseball-Reference.com: View Original Table
Generated 4/19/2013.
The first three columns deal with sacrifice bunts, every old-time baseball fan's favorite play. Whether it's good strategy or not isn't for me to decide (it's a decidedly league choice due to the DH), but generally speaking, it works. It's too early in the season to make grand pronouncements, but anything that succeeds 80% of the time has to be deemed effective. The TRUE measure of success would be if the runner sacrificed over eventually scored, and I might measure that some day, since I had a flash earlier this week as to how to do that.
GDPs are possibly the most misunderstood things in the game. Of course, no team wants them, but what is shown here is the full story, more than just the bad occasions when they occur. At the end of the season, the team with the fewest GDPs rarely has a good record, because the easiest way to have a low number of GDPs is to not have base runners. The more important number is the opportunities to hit into a double play. The other important part is that percentage, because the difference between the Dodgers at 10% and the Rangers at 15% is substantial--a 50% increase, in fact. Plus, using that example, the Rangers have the same number of double plays in 30 fewer opportunities--not good.
The third set of data are productive outs, which are generally defined as moving the runner over, or a successful sacrifice if the pitcher is at bat (you can go to B-R for the precise definition). This just quantifies what fans already know--not all outs are the same. When White Sox fans pull their hair out over Adam Dunn striking out, this is the reason--sometimes the runner can be moved over and be driven in later. Of course, the real reason for the Sox consternation over Dunn is his .105 batting average and .164 OBP--ouch.
I LOVE the next set of data, so much that I collect it myself as I glean play-by-play data. It's what is at the crux of the RBI, which is that a runner that isn't on base can't be driven in. This is why some batting order positions (#3-#5) have higher RBI, because they typically have more opportunities. By the end of the season, that league number will be closer to 14.5-15%, which is the historical number going back quite some time. THIS is where you can tell the successful teams from the also-rans--the better teams have runners on base, the worse don't. By the end of the season, all teams will also be roughly in that 14-16% range (with some outliers)--it's the teams that have more opportunities that win, because all the teams drive them in at a similar rate.
The last columns are interesting, but I won't spend much time on them. The first three are facts that need to be ingrained in every fan's head--with less than two outs and a runner on third, a hitter is successful in getting that runner home 52% of the time, or a little over half. Everyone immediately assumes "Yeah, sac fly, piece of cake," which is clearly NOT the case. There's situational hitting--and situational PITCHING just as well. If that pitcher is doing his job correctly, he's throwing at the knees or jamming the hitter, doing everything he can to make sure he can't get a bat under the ball. Is the pitcher successful all the time? Of course not, but the sacrifice fly isn't a gimme. The second set interests me less, it's a runner on 2nd with 0 outs and that runner being advanced.
These are vitally important numbers that have only recently been available at our fingertips. I'll end with one very important comment--there's not a fact or statistic on this page that hasn't been known by baseball lifers for years, and most likely quantified as well. Managers and coaches know--the only difference is that we do now also.
Generated 4/19/2013.
The first three columns deal with sacrifice bunts, every old-time baseball fan's favorite play. Whether it's good strategy or not isn't for me to decide (it's a decidedly league choice due to the DH), but generally speaking, it works. It's too early in the season to make grand pronouncements, but anything that succeeds 80% of the time has to be deemed effective. The TRUE measure of success would be if the runner sacrificed over eventually scored, and I might measure that some day, since I had a flash earlier this week as to how to do that.
GDPs are possibly the most misunderstood things in the game. Of course, no team wants them, but what is shown here is the full story, more than just the bad occasions when they occur. At the end of the season, the team with the fewest GDPs rarely has a good record, because the easiest way to have a low number of GDPs is to not have base runners. The more important number is the opportunities to hit into a double play. The other important part is that percentage, because the difference between the Dodgers at 10% and the Rangers at 15% is substantial--a 50% increase, in fact. Plus, using that example, the Rangers have the same number of double plays in 30 fewer opportunities--not good.
The third set of data are productive outs, which are generally defined as moving the runner over, or a successful sacrifice if the pitcher is at bat (you can go to B-R for the precise definition). This just quantifies what fans already know--not all outs are the same. When White Sox fans pull their hair out over Adam Dunn striking out, this is the reason--sometimes the runner can be moved over and be driven in later. Of course, the real reason for the Sox consternation over Dunn is his .105 batting average and .164 OBP--ouch.
I LOVE the next set of data, so much that I collect it myself as I glean play-by-play data. It's what is at the crux of the RBI, which is that a runner that isn't on base can't be driven in. This is why some batting order positions (#3-#5) have higher RBI, because they typically have more opportunities. By the end of the season, that league number will be closer to 14.5-15%, which is the historical number going back quite some time. THIS is where you can tell the successful teams from the also-rans--the better teams have runners on base, the worse don't. By the end of the season, all teams will also be roughly in that 14-16% range (with some outliers)--it's the teams that have more opportunities that win, because all the teams drive them in at a similar rate.
The last columns are interesting, but I won't spend much time on them. The first three are facts that need to be ingrained in every fan's head--with less than two outs and a runner on third, a hitter is successful in getting that runner home 52% of the time, or a little over half. Everyone immediately assumes "Yeah, sac fly, piece of cake," which is clearly NOT the case. There's situational hitting--and situational PITCHING just as well. If that pitcher is doing his job correctly, he's throwing at the knees or jamming the hitter, doing everything he can to make sure he can't get a bat under the ball. Is the pitcher successful all the time? Of course not, but the sacrifice fly isn't a gimme. The second set interests me less, it's a runner on 2nd with 0 outs and that runner being advanced.
These are vitally important numbers that have only recently been available at our fingertips. I'll end with one very important comment--there's not a fact or statistic on this page that hasn't been known by baseball lifers for years, and most likely quantified as well. Managers and coaches know--the only difference is that we do now also.
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